



STATE REL ATIONS 
AND POWER
Philip Hammond
The media are often understood to be simply an extension of state power in non-democratic, 
non-Western countries. They are therefore sometimes viewed as implicated in war crimes 
– such as in Rwanda, where three media executives were convicted by the United Nations’ 
(UN’s) international criminal tribunal for having incited genocide in 1994. The media can 
also be treated as legitimate military targets – as during the 1999 Kosovo conflict, when 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) bombed the main television building in central 
Belgrade, killing the civilian employees inside. In both of these cases, the assumption was 
that the role of the media in conflict is to act as an instrument of power, whether they are 
state-run (as in the Serbian case) or privately owned (as in Rwanda). In Western democracies, 
in contrast, the assumption is that the media (including national broadcasters such as the 
BBC) are independent: able to act as a watchdog on the powerful rather than simply being 
an arm of official authority.
Yet there is a long tradition of critical scholarship which questions this view. Analysts have 
argued that the range of opinions available in the free Western media is constricted, ‘indexed’ 
to the views of elite sources (Bennett 1990); that debate is limited to a narrow sphere of 
‘legitimate controversy’ (Hallin 1989); and that the news media – especially in coverage of 
foreign policy and war – produce propaganda rather than independent journalism (Herman 
and Chomsky 2002). For many critics, these problems are not contingent – a product of war 
fever or patriotism, say – but are systemic, and derive from the fundamental characteristics 
of the media in capitalist democracies.
This chapter will review the key claims of this radical tradition, but the main aim in 
what follows is to assess how far it remains useful for understanding news coverage of 
contemporary conflicts. Perhaps the most obvious reason its relevance has been doubted in 
recent years is that new online communications seem to call into question the importance of 
theorising how and why the news media serve the interests of power. If activists in repressive 
states can circumvent or challenge state propaganda, as in Egypt or Libya during the 2011 
‘Arab Spring’, we might expect even greater freedom in democratic societies. Recent work 
on how the conduct of war has been transformed by a ‘new media ecology characterized by 
connectivity, emergence and contingency’ (Hoskins and O’Loughlin 2010: 168), suggests to 
Theorising media/state relations and power
81
some analysts that the goal of demonstrating how mainstream print and broadcast media are 
subservient to power is much less important.
The radical critique
It is slightly misleading to write of ‘the’ critical or radical tradition, but there is not space here 
for a detailed exposition of differences of approach and emphasis. Instead, this section will 
attempt to draw out some common themes in relation to three key issues for understanding 
the media/state relationship: official constraint and manipulation of the media; patterns of 
media ownership and commercialisation; and the professional practices and routines of 
journalism itself. The best illustration of the overall approach is Edward Herman and Noam 
Chomsky’s propaganda model, because of both its comprehensive scope and its frequent 
citation in studies of war reporting.
Of these three issues, the first might be thought to be the most significant in war coverage, 
and indeed there is no shortage of studies detailing the long and sorry history of efforts by 
Western governments, militaries and intelligence services to manipulate, censor and control 
the news in wartime (see Knightley 2003 for and historical overview). The potential scope 
of coercive state power over the media should not be underestimated. In the 1980s the 
British government commandeered a BBC transmitter on Ascension Island to broadcast 
black propaganda to Argentine troops during the Falklands conflict (Harris 1983: 119), for 
example, and at home it banned the broadcasting of statements by Irish Republican political 
leaders (Miller 1995). In legal provisions for ‘defence and emergency arrangements’, the 
British government has the power to require the BBC to broadcast any material it chooses, 
or to prevent it from broadcasting any material. It can also require the BBC to act as an 
‘agent of the Crown’ in monitoring and reporting on others’ media output; and, while the 
BBC’s domestic services are funded by licence-fee payers, the Corporation receives direct 
government funding for the World Service and is answerable to the Foreign Office for its 
overseas programming.1
However, the radical tradition starts from the fact that in Western democracies direct 
state censorship and control of the news media is the exception rather than the rule. This 
is not because Western states are seen as benign – to the contrary, critics such as Herman 
and Chomsky are centrally concerned with how the media work as a propaganda system 
to legitimise the nefarious activities of the US and other Western governments. Rather, the 
point is to explain how the media generally do this spontaneously with relatively little direct 
state control. As Ralph Miliband wrote in 1969: ‘In no field do the claims of democratic 
diversity and free political competition which are made on behalf of the “open societies” 
of advanced capitalism appear to be more valid than in the field of communications.’ 
Nevertheless, he went on to observe, the media are ‘a crucial element in the legitimation of 
capitalist society’, supporting ‘the prevailing system of power and privilege’ and fostering a 
‘climate of conformity’ (Miliband 2013). Explaining this apparent paradox is at the heart of 
the radical critique.
Herman and Chomsky identify five ‘news filters’ which ‘allow the government and 
dominant private interests to get their messages across to the public’ (2002: 2). Notably, the 
first two of these – ‘size, ownership and profit orientation’, and ‘the advertising licence to do 
business’ – concern the nature of the news media as private businesses. In other words, it is 
simply the character of media themselves as capitalist enterprises, and their enmeshing with 
other private businesses, which does most to explain how they tend to work routinely in 
ways which support the socio-economic status quo. As in other sectors, the media industry 
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has seen a trend toward increased concentration of ownership and large-scale investment 
by other major companies and banks, but unlike most other sectors of the economy, in the 
case of news media this has potentially far-reaching effects on the public sphere in terms 
of the quality of information and range of opinion available to citizens. The importance of 
attracting advertising revenue also means that the media are less likely to carry content which 
might alienate either their sponsors or their more affluent readers and viewers.
In foregrounding the importance of the media’s business interests, Herman and Chomsky 
are squarely in the tradition of ‘political economy’ analysts, such as Herbert Schiller (1976) 
in the US or Graham Murdock and Peter Golding (1974) in the UK. Although they are 
addressing a US context, it is worth noting that Herman and Chomsky draw extensively 
on British press history (as told in James Curran and Jean Seaton’s (2010) Power without 
Responsibility) to illustrate their argument. Indeed, one of the most striking examples of 
how interlocking interests can shape the media’s relationship with power is the behaviour 
of Rupert Murdoch’s News International in the UK in the 1980s. In the bitter year-long 
Wapping dispute, when more than 5,000 print workers were sacked in a bid to end trades-
union influence, there was a clear convergence between the commercial interests of News 
International and the aggressively anti-trades-union programme of Margaret Thatcher’s 
Conservative government. The editorial support for the Conservatives offered by Murdoch’s 
papers throughout the decade was reciprocated by government (and police) support for 
News International against its employees.
Herman and Chomsky (2002: 18–19) also suggest that economic considerations are one 
of the factors underpinning the media’s reliance on a narrow range of official sources (their 
third ‘filter’), since the public relations bureaucracies of state and corporate sources offer a 
ready supply of authoritative news. An over-reliance on official sources is a well-established 
feature of routine journalism, but is particularly pronounced in coverage of war and conflict, 
when the range of opinions and views aired in the media tend to be even more closely 
‘indexed’ to those of the political mainstream (Mermin 1999). Herman and Chomsky (2002: 
19) note that this is in part a result of the established professional conventions of ‘objective’ 
journalism, used strategically by reporters to protect themselves and their employers from 
charges of bias (Tuchman 1972). As Daniel Hallin (1989: 25) observes in his study of coverage 
of Vietnam, ‘The effect of “objectivity” was not to free the news of political influence, but to 
open wide the channel through which official influence flowed.’
Although a (mistaken) perception of media disloyalty led to greater official efforts to 
control and censor news in post-Vietnam conflicts, a more cooperative relationship began to 
develop in the 1990s. Government and military attempts to manage the media have, in more 
recent years, tended to work more through informal and indirect methods of influence, 
such as choosing which correspondents to accredit, embedding reporters with military units, 
offering formal and informal briefings, and generally attempting to co-opt the media rather 
than simply repress them. As their fourth filter, Herman and Chomsky include both direct 
and indirect ‘flak’ from powerful voices seeking to bring the media into line if they stray off 
message. While overt censorship is relatively rare even in wartime, flak is standard operating 
procedure: UK political leaders sharply criticised BBC journalists for treating Argentine 
and British claims too even-handedly in the Falklands (Harris 1983: 75), for becoming the 
‘Baghdad Broadcasting Corporation’ in the 1991 Gulf war (Keeble 1997: 168), and for acting 
as a ‘mouthpiece’ for the Serbian authorities in the Kosovo conflict (Hammond 2000: 126), 
for example.
The point of such criticisms is to define the scope of acceptable debate; the bounds within 
which journalistic ‘balance’ can operate. Ideas or views which fall outside the range of what 
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Hallin (1989: 117) calls ‘legitimate controversy’, are excluded or marginalised as ‘deviant’. 
This is also the key to understanding Herman and Chomsky’s final filter, ‘anti-communism’. 
Since the Cold War ended soon after the first publication of Herman and Chomsky’s 
Manufacturing Consent in 1988, this has long been seen as needing to be updated, and various 
alternative enemies (particularly radical Islamism) have been suggested as substitutes for 
the Soviets. Herman (2000: 109) himself, however, has argued that in a world ‘where non-
market solutions seem utopian’, journalists have internalised the belief that ‘markets are…
benevolent and non-market mechanisms are suspect’. The original proposition was less to do 
with unity against enemy hate-figures, important though this is in wartime propaganda, and 
more to do with underlying shared beliefs. As Hallin (1989: 117) suggests, ‘the journalist’s 
role is to serve as an advocate and celebrant of consensus values’ (see also Hall 1973: 88).
Herman and Chomsky devote most of their book to empirical evidence supporting and 
illustrating the model, focusing on the reporting of war, conflict and international affairs. 
Their approach typically involves examining paired examples to show how news coverage 
of conflict generally follows the interests of Western governments in either highlighting 
suffering and atrocities or looking the other way and excusing them, as appropriate – for 
instance in the different treatment of conflict in Libya in 2011 compared with Sri Lanka in 
2008–9 (Herman and Peterson 2011: xiv–xvii). Yet despite naming it a ‘propaganda model’, 
it was not intended as narrowly applicable only to the behaviour of the media in wartime, 
which is perhaps what we mostly associate with the term propaganda. Rather, the point was 
to challenge the assumed contrast, much like that pointed up at the start of this chapter, 
between the propaganda systems of authoritarian states and the free, independent media of 
the democratic West (Herman and Chomsky 2002: lvix).
The challenge of complexity
Before going on to assess the radical critique, it is important to clarify the arguments which 
question its relevance for today’s digital, online world. We can broadly distinguish two ways 
of conceptualising how new media challenge the claims of the radical tradition. The first is 
to argue that the pluralism claimed in liberal understandings of the media (a ‘free market of 
ideas’) can now finally be realised, since new media have the potential to liberate us from the 
distortions of monopoly ownership and the shackles of state control. The second approach 
draws on complexity theory to argue that the new media ecology which we now inhabit 
problematises previous understandings of media and power, and that neither the radical 
critique nor traditional liberal ideas are adequate to explain our new situation. This section 
will deal with each of these in turn, but the second argument, elaborated specifically in 
relation to war reporting by Andrew Hoskins and Ben O’Loughlin (2010), will be the main 
focus, since it presents the more fundamental challenge to theorising media/state relations 
and power.
The claim that the ‘transformative impact of new media technologies’ has produced a 
‘radically pluralised information sphere’ has been tested by Piers Robinson et al. (2010: 79) 
in their systematic analysis of coverage of the 2003 Iraq war. As one would expect both from 
the radical critique and from previous empirical studies of war reporting, they found that 
‘official sources and actors dominated television and press coverage and ensured that the 
story of the invasion was narrated largely through the voice of the coalition’ (Robinson et 
al. 2010: 80). This elite dominance of ‘old’ media remains significant, particularly in the 
case of television, which is still the main source of news for most people.2 ‘Old’ media 
organisations, moreover, are hardly at a disadvantage in the online world: of the ten news 
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websites with the highest monthly traffic in the US, eight are linked to established news 
providers such as The New York Times or CNN (Pew Research Center 2013). The picture is 
similar in the UK, where the BBC dominates online news consumption (Newman and Levy 
2013). As with older media, online news provision seems to be following a similar pattern of 
concentration in the hands of a few large players. Similarly, elite efforts to influence media 
messages in wartime have long extended to online as well as print and broadcast media, 
whether through official efforts such as the US State Department’s Digital Outreach Team 
and the Defense Department’s Bloggers Roundtable, indirectly through non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) such as the Cyber Century Forum’s ‘Spirit of America’ project, or 
covertly through funding and supplying politically friendly bloggers in targeted countries. 
As Donald Matheson and Stuart Allan (2009: 125) observe, ‘governments are aware of the 
advantages to be gained in using citizen media to further their military and political aims, 
especially where they can cloak such efforts in the mantle of independent media’. None of 
this is to say that the rise of new media is not highly significant, and overall it is indeed much 
more difficult for elites to control media messages in wartime. But there are strong empirical 
grounds for doubting that we are now in such a pluralistic media environment that business 
and state influence over the news is no longer a concern.
Nevertheless, this does not settle the matter, since one could argue that we are seeing 
only the beginning of trends that are likely to develop much further, and that the potential 
for genuine plurality could be realised in future. Moreover, while it is true that Hoskins 
and O’Loughlin put the idea of a ‘new media ecology’ at the centre of their argument, their 
approach involves more than simply a set of empirically based claims which can be tested by 
gathering further evidence. Robinson et al. (2010: 169) tackle claims about the impact of new 
technologies as part of what they call the ‘media empowerment thesis’, and link this both 
to a ‘wider cultural obsession with computer technology’ and to older debates such as that 
surrounding the ‘CNN effect’. The notion of the ‘CNN effect’ implies a reversal of the state/
media relationship, whereby the media become the active partner, driving the policy agenda 
rather than being subservient to the political elite. What Hoskins and O’Loughlin (2010: 85) 
are proposing, however, is not a reversal of power relationships, but the breakdown of ‘linear 
cause-and-effect models’ of communication in a world characterised by unpredictability and 
diffuseness. Notwithstanding their emphasis on new technologies, what is really novel in 
the ‘new media ecology’ they describe is not so much the extent of new media use (which 
may be exaggerated), but the reconceptualisation of the media as a whole as an ‘ecology’ 
which can be understood in terms of complexity theory, as ‘characterized by connectivity, 
emergence and contingency’ (2010: 168).
Complexity theory is now widely taken up across the social sciences (see Byrne and 
Callaghan 2014 for an overview). Complexity approaches are not making an epistemological 
claim, about our inability to know and predict patterns of cause and effect which are 
nevertheless understood to operate deterministically, but an ontological one: that the world 
itself consists of overlapping complex systems or processes in which we are embedded and 
which produce unpredictable effects and outcomes. The assemblages of complex life are not 
simply chaotic or disordered, but neither are they knowable according to any linear cause-
and-effect models. Rather, order is an emergent property of self-organising complex systems, 
and is knowable only after the fact. Although Hoskins and O’Loughlin (2010: 17) are a little 
unusual in dating the rise of complexity to the start of the twenty-first century and explaining 
its appearance as an effect of new communications technologies, their work is clearly part 
of this larger intellectual shift. Others have discussed how complexity theory helps us to 
understand developments in Western foreign policy and military strategy (Lawson 2014; 
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O’Kane 2006; Roderick 2007), often with the suggestion that Western states might learn 
from terrorist organisations who are more at home in a complex world (Bousquet 2012). 
Hoskins and O’Loughlin (2010: 8–9, 12) make a similar suggestion, and argue that states 
and ‘Big Media’ organizations need to adapt to a world of complexity rather than hanging on 
to outmoded linear ideas about managing communications (2010: 85). This latter point is 
drawn out well by Steven Corman et al., who note the ineffectiveness of America’s strategic 
communications efforts in the war on terror, and diagnose the problem as a 1950s-vintage 
‘message influence model’. Their advice is that the US and its allies should ‘deemphasize 
control and embrace complexity’ (Corman et al. 2007: 15).
For our purposes, the key implication here is that media researchers also need to recognise 
that their models and paradigms no longer work. According to Hoskins and O’Loughlin (2010: 
185–6) all established concepts, theories and methodologies in the study of war and media 
have ‘imploded’ because ‘there is no stable object around which a research paradigm could 
cohere’. Instead, insight can come only via ‘an openness to new and emergent phenomena 
rather than a reification of existing institutions and structures’ (2010: 190). Tellingly, their 
book ends with a chapter on ‘Methods’: unlike in the traditional social-science model, where 
the methods section outlines how the research question will be addressed, the aim is not so 
much to find answers as to enrich our ability for self-reflection on how we can learn from 
the processes and practices of complex life. As David Chandler (2014: 221) observes in his 
study of complexity approaches to governance, from a complexity perspective ‘critique can 
no longer operate on the basis of revealing “unifying principles” such as the inner-workings 
of power or the supposed structures of domination’, since this would only ‘reinforce reified 
categories of thought’. Instead, complexity means that both researchers and political actors 
must adopt a very different orientation to the world: not as sovereign subjects confronting 
an object to be investigated or acted upon, but as reflexive subjects ‘always and already 
relationally-embedded in processes of emergent causality’ (2014: 222).
If we understand Hoskins and O’Loughlin as offering a particularly media-centric version 
of a more general intellectual vogue for complexity, this raises the question of what, if not 
new media, might be prompting that broader trend. A useful point of comparison here is 
Brian McNair’s (2005: 151) somewhat similar argument that we should abandon the idea 
that the media are ‘instruments of control concentrated in the hands of dominant elites’, 
and instead recognise that they are ‘autonomous and increasingly unruly agencies…over 
which those elites, including even the proprietors of big media capital, have relatively little 
control’. McNair makes his case in terms of the (related but different) concept of chaos, 
rather than complexity, but the more interesting contrast is that he recognises the importance 
of political factors in the changes he highlights. After 9/11 and in the run-up to the 2003 
Iraq war, when one might have expected the ‘control paradigm’ to have been very much 
in evidence, elite attempts to ‘set the terms of the debate’ were, McNair argues, ‘singularly 
unsuccessful’, with an abundance of highly critical news coverage (2005: 156). Yet rather 
than seeing this as simply a media phenomenon, McNair suggests that in a ‘political 
environment of substantially greater volatility and uncertainty’, in which the ‘ideological 
dividing lines’ of the Cold War era have collapsed, elites ‘find it difficult to act as unified 
blocs or to exercise effective power over the media’ (McNair 2005: 157, 159, 155). While the 
challenge to the radical tradition’s emphasis on media subservience to the elite is similar, this 
is a useful corrective to media-centrism. So while for Hoskins and O’Loughlin (2010: 188–
9) the ‘emergence’ of the meaning of 9/11 from everyday practices rather than from official 
narratives stands as an example of how ‘life is mediatized’, McNair’s broader perspective 
suggests that if elite narratives lack coherence or authority this might have more to do with 
Philip Hammond
86
the larger political context of the post-Cold War era, rather than simply being caused by new 
media or being a symptom of complexity.
While the further growth and development of online media will continue to be important, 
then, it does not really make sense to treat this in isolation and take it as the starting point 
of explanation: rather, its significance is shaped by broader contextual factors. Something 
similar might be said of the theoretical perspectives considered in this chapter: although these 
have been discussed in terms of paradigms and models, attempts to theorise and critique 
the media are also developed in specific historical contexts and take shape in response to 
particular conditions. As we now move on to assess the radical tradition and contemporary 
challenges to it, we need to consider how the meaning of critique is altered by changing 
circumstances.
The changing context of critique
Most of what the radical tradition said about the media – regarding their capitalist interests, 
dependence on advertising, reliance on official sources and vulnerability to flak – still holds 
true of print and broadcast media, and applies equally well to significant parts of the online 
world. However, the final ‘filter’, which identifies shared political values and beliefs, works 
at best inconsistently and intermittently today. It is true that Margaret Thatcher’s dictum 
that ‘there is no alternative’ to the market is now taken for granted, but this narrow and 
diminished view of the future is more like a passive background resignation than a positive 
celebration of common convictions. This may seem like a minor point, or perhaps even as an 
encouraging sign for proponents of the radical critique. But the collapse of Left/Right politics 
at the end of the 1980s has had far-reaching consequences, equally disorientating both for 
Western elites and their critics.
With the breakdown of the broader political framework of meaning through which 
modern societies made sense of change, public life has become hollow and unappealing, 
leaving Western elites increasingly isolated and, notwithstanding their incessant talk of 
‘shared values’, unable to connect with and give direction to their societies. As Alexander 
Gourevitch (2007: 64) argues, when domestic political contestation is negligible, the ‘national 
interest’ becomes much harder to define, since it is ‘only when the fundamental organizing 
intuitions of society are challenged that the question of the national interest poses itself in a 
consistent way’. Since the end of the Cold War, Western governments have indeed found it 
‘exceedingly difficult to define [their] “national interest”’, in the words of Condoleezza Rice 
(2000), producing a confusion which goes well beyond the ‘elite dissensus’ allowed for in 
the radical critique. Western governments have repeatedly looked to the international stage 
– from the announcement of a ‘New World Order’, through the elaboration of a doctrine 
of ‘humanitarian military intervention’, to the declaration of ‘war on terror’ – as the most 
promising sphere to try and work up a sense of purpose or mission. Yet this narcissistic 
turn in foreign affairs has led only to incoherent, opportunistic and inept policy-making. 
Even supposed successes like Kosovo or Bosnia are hardly beacons of democratic peace and 
stability; while more recent interventions, in Afghanistan, Iraq or Libya, have produced 
appalling chaos with no obvious benefit for the intervening powers.
This is an equally confusing situation for radical critics who have tended to assume 
the existence of reasonably coherent elite interests, which compliant media then serve. In 
the peculiar circumstances of the present, there is some truth in the claim that the media 
continue to follow elite agendas, and in the apparently contradictory claim that there are 
unprecedented levels of media criticism and unruliness. It is surely the case, for example, 
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that as Robinson et al. demonstrate, most mainstream coverage of Iraq slavishly reproduced 
the perspective of official Western sources. Yet it is also true that the sort of unruly or chaotic 
media behaviour described by McNair was much in evidence, including in the mainstream, 
although what he identifies as critical reporting would be better characterised as a cynical self-
consciousness. The same impulse which has repeatedly led politicians to seek meaning and 
purpose in international affairs has at the same time made the conduct of war acutely image-
conscious, encouraging an ironic, distanced style of coverage (see further Hammond 2007). 
More genuinely critical perspectives were of course available, notably online. Yet as Jodi Dean 
(2005: 52) observes, ‘despite the terabytes of [online] commentary and information, there 
wasn’t exactly a debate over the [Iraq] war’. Equally, despite the subservience of much of the 
mainstream, there wasn’t exactly a consensus either. The idea of a ‘non-linear’ and ‘diffuse’ 
world of ‘emergence’ captures something of how things appear from the perspective of a 
confused and disconnected elite who have trouble coming up with a coherent message, who 
cannot rely on media or audiences to react in predictable ways, and who are necessarily less 
able than in the past to control today’s global, multi-perspectival information environment. 
Yet if there has been a conceptual ‘implosion’ in the way Hoskins and O’Loughlin describe, 
it is better understood in terms of politics rather than technology. The radical critique has 
limited traction now because we are no longer living in a universe of Left and Right where 
coherent political worldviews confront one another.
The influence of the radical critique has varied depending on circumstances and the 
fortunes of the wider political Left. In Britain, as Curran (2002: 39, 141) recounts, following 
the ‘high-water mark of this tradition’ in the 1970s, its ‘self-immolation’ in the 1980s 
paralleled the decline and defeat of the labour movement and the Left during that decade. 
He has in mind the sorts of theoretical debates described by Greg Philo and David Miller 
(2001) as the ‘dead ends of media/cultural studies’, which largely revolved around the 
question of the public, dividing between those who foregrounded the ability of audiences 
to contest dominant meanings versus those who emphasised the ideological influence of 
the media. The unfortunate implication was that to be radical was to insist on people’s 
vulnerability to potent media messages; a position which also provided an alibi for the Left’s 
declining influence. Around the same time, government antipathy toward the BBC led 
many to turn a critique of private ownership into a defence of state regulation (Curran 2002: 
124). Curran seems confident that the radical tradition continues and can be renewed, but 
although contemporary analyses of the media sometimes seem to echo the radical critique 
of the past, the political content is usually quite different. Today, ritualistic denunciations 
of neoliberalism may sound radical, but are often accompanied by enthusiastic support for 
ever-greater state control of the media (Garland and Harper 2012); and in regard to questions 
of war and conflict a sense of political disorientation is even more evident as self-styled 
leftists and radicals are often the most fervent advocates of Western intervention (Herman 
and Peterson 2011: xviii).
In its earlier formulations, the radical tradition always assumed the possibility of large-
scale social transformation and implicitly addressed a political subject who could carry such 
change through. With the collapse of established Left/Right politics, though, that assumption 
can no longer be made. It would be difficult to overstate the implications of the political 
changes that have happened since the end of the Cold War, a historic shift which represented 
the end of modernist politics. When Walter Lippmann and others initially wrote of the 
‘manufacture’ or ‘engineering’ of consent in the aftermath of the First World War, they were 
voicing elite fears about the threat to capitalist order posed by a politically active public (Carey 
1997). Often expressed in terms of worries about popular passions and irrational forces 
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which needed to be controlled, elite concerns were prompted by the tumultuous entry of 
the masses into public life in an era of war, revolution and economic upheaval. When radical 
critics in the late 1960s and 1970s set out to challenge the ideological role of the media, they 
did so in the context of a lively Left political culture and robust working-class organisation. 
Today, by contrast, the concerns of Western elites centre on public disengagement from 
politics and the difficulty of finding points of connection with electorates. Now when 
thinkers such as Lippmann are invoked it is because they address the question of how to 
understand the formation of publics in (what would now be called) a complex, globalised 
world, in which previous frameworks of political representation and identification appear 
hollow and unappealing (Marres 2005). In such circumstances, much ‘radical’ critique often 
seems either to echo elitist assumptions about the vulnerability of media audiences or to 
reinforce popular disengagement from politics.
Complexity approaches are certainly sensitive to change, but offer no alternative, since 
from this perspective ‘power relations can easily evaporate into complex processes of indirect 
interconnection’ (Chandler 2014: 123). Political and military power have hardly become any 
less of a problem just because we live in a ‘globalised’ or interconnected world. Indeed, the 
arbitrary and incoherent exercise of power by today’s purposeless elites is arguably even more 
destructive and dangerous than the imperialism of old. Furthermore, critics who interpret 
today’s ‘chaotic’ media culture as critical and democratic are obliged to ignore the extent to 
which journalists have frequently joined with great enthusiasm in the pursuit of narcissistic 
foreign policy, urging greater projection of Western military power in the Balkans, Africa and 
the Middle East. The assumption that the free Western media play the democratic role of 
holding power to account looks just as questionable as it always did, even though we need to 
refine how we understand the problem and respond to it.
What was good about the radical tradition at its best was that it abstracted from the particular 
to draw out the underlying dynamics of media performance in capitalist democracies, with 
a clear sense that this was fundamentally shaped by wider socio-economic arrangements. Its 
most problematic legacy is that a critique of private ownership has morphed into advocacy of 
ever more state regulation, as if the problem all along was too much media freedom (Hume 
2012). Having begun from the premise, highlighted at start of this chapter, that the key thing 
to explain was how the free media of democratic societies act as agents of power despite 
relatively little direct state interference, today the aim of much media criticism seems to be 
to encourage greater official regulation (Media Reform Coalition 2012). Such an approach 
seems more likely to encourage a climate of conformity than to disrupt it. The presumption 
used to be that by identifying structures of power these could be resisted and overturned, 
but such is our contemporary failure of political imagination that perhaps it not so surprising 
if, set against the apparent fluidity of the networked world, to many observers this approach 
now looks more like ‘reifying’ power structures than challenging them.
Notes
 1 Broadcasting Agreement, 2006 (CM6872), paragraphs 81, 88, 64, http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/
bbctrust/assets/files/pdf/about/how_we_govern/agreement.pdf (accessed 17 May 2016).
 2 According to the Pew Research Center, even in a highly ‘wired’ nation such as the US, most 
people still turn to TV as their main source of news; while of the 38 per cent who go online for 
news, even the heaviest users spend on average only four minutes per day on online news sites 
(Olmstead et al. 2013). The two most popular social networking sites, Facebook and YouTube, 
are used as a source of news by 30 per cent and 10 per cent of the US population respectively 
(Holcomb et al. 2013). According to Ofcom (2013), in the UK 78 per cent of people view TV 
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news and 32 per cent use the Internet for news, with over half of the latter using the BBC 
website.
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